However Fletcher and Taylor (1996) find that deviations from CIRP are neither rare nor short lived in the long dated capital market. They do not provide an economic reason why this is the case however. Moreover, CIRP has not been examined for capital markets outside the OECD club. This paper seeks to address these gaps by examining CIRP for Brazil, Chile, Russia and South Korea for the short and long-term horizons.
We are also curious to see whether the size of the economy plays any role in evident violations in covered interest rate parity. For instance, the volume of foreign exchange transactions can be much smaller for modest sized economies so a lack of liquidity can lead to violations in covered interest rate parity. For this reason we also examine the United Kingdom, a large triple A rated economy and Norway, a small triple A rated economy and compare their results with the emerging market economies.
A salient feature of this study is the quality of the data. This study uses time synchronised closing daily mid, bid and ask prices for the spot currency, three month and five year forward currency exchange rates, three month interest rate, five year swap interest rate and five year credit default swap rates as reported by Bloomberg™ as of 16:30 British Standard Time BST. Only data for instruments that were flagged by Bloomberg™ as actively traded were used. The credit default swap data allows for an examination of the role of credit risk and the bid and ask data allows for an examination of the role of transaction cost in explaining apparent deviations in CIRP. This paper finds that for a three-month time horizon, deviations in CIRP are rare and are nearly fully explained by transaction costs for all four emerging markets that are examined. Any remaining violations are trivial. However, deviations in CIRP can be large and frequent for the long-term capital markets. Specifically, after transactions costs Brazil, Chile, Russia and South Korea all show some degree of violation in CIRP at a five-year horizon. In contrast Norway and the UK show no evidence of violation of covered interest rate parity at either the three-month or five year horizons.
This suggests that it is credit risk rather than the size of the economy that is related to violations in CIRP. While credit default swaps CDS can help explain some of the emerging market violations, still large and frequent CIRP violations remains. In fact, when insuring deviations from CIRP with CDS the deviation from covered interest rate parity often changes sign from a large negative to a large positive thereby suggesting that CDS contracts overprice credit risk. However, regressing proxies for credit risk on deviations from covered interest rate parity finds that credit risk is the likely explanation as the largest violations of covered interest rate parity are associated with factors related to credit risk. Overall this paper finds that there is indeed violations in covered interest rate parity in the long-term capital markets and the source of these violations is credit risk rather than the size of the economy or liquidity of the foreign exchange market.
The plan for this paper is as follows. Section I derives CIRP for single and multiple periods and show how CIRP can be obtained even in the presence of credit risk.
Section II introduces the data and the methodology. Section III presents the numerical analysis that examines the size and importance of discrepancies in covered interest rate parity. Section IV conducts a regression analysis on discrepancies in covered interest rate parity. Section V then summarises and concludes.
I CIRP with and without credit risk
To appreciate how credit risk impacts on CIRP, it is useful to review classic CIRP in detail. The problem faced by an investor wishing to access higher foreign interest rates r f > r is shown in the diagram below. Note that S represents the number of foreign currency units per USD (i.e. 3 Brazilian reals to $1).
Transaction
T = 0 T = 1 Borrow initial investment S 0 and agree to pay domestic interest rate r and principal with funds received from foreign bonds S 1 to be converted into dollars one period hence.
Convert to foreign currency -S 0 and purchase foreign bonds paying interest r f .
After borrowing at the domestic interest rate r, converting dollars to the foreign currency S 0 and investing in the foreign bonds, the investor can not be sure if a depreciation in the exchange rate one period hence S 1 will more than offset gains from investing in the higher interest rate r f foreign bonds. Therefore the investor will seek to hedge by selling the foreign currency one period hence S 1 forward F 1 . As exchange rate risk is now eliminated and the above position has no net investment then to avoid costless and riskless arbitrage the following must hold. Borrow initial investment S 0 . Pay domestic interest rate r and principal with funds received from foreign bonds S 1 . Hedge foreign exchange risk today by selling S 1 forward at exchange rate F 1 .
Purchase default insurance C on the foreign bond S o .
Now the investor cannot be sure if a default of the foreign bond will eliminate promised gains from investing in the higher interest rate r f foreign bonds. Therefore the investor will purchase credit protection by purchasing a credit default swap C on the foreign bond.
2 If the bond does not default then at maturity the cash flows are precisely the same as in the default rate free case as the CDS expires worthless.
However, if the bond defaults and is now only worth S 0 (1+r f )δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) then the investor receives compensation from the credit protection seller S 0 (1+r f )(1-δ) to top up the value of the investment to the promised maturity value S 0 (1+r f ). Therefore in the event of default payoffs from the CDS ensure that the cash flows remain the same as in the default free case.
As exchange rate and default risks are now eliminated then to avoid costless and riskless arbitrage the following must hold. 
II Data and Methodology
One problem encountered in examining covered interest rate parity is a lack of high quality observations on long-term interest rates the terms of which are comparable across different markets. A ready solution is the interest rate swap market. This market has evolved into one of the most important international fixed income markets.
This instrument allows investors to convert a sequence of floating rate payments into a fixed stream and vice versa. The quote is always the fixed rate against the floating rate flat, i.e., pay 8% and receive LIBOR flat, and virtually all swaps are governed by the terms and conditions specified by the International Swap Dealers Association.
There is a close relationship between the swap rates and the underlying national yield curve as the swap fixed rates are set as a spread off national benchmark bonds.
Moreover, bid and ask prices are available so transaction costs can also be estimated.
Therefore this paper will use the fixed interest rate on domestic and foreign swap contracts as the domestic r and foreign r f interest rates in evaluating covered interest rate parity for long term capital markets because a) swap terms and conditions are comparable across different markets b) swaps are liquid instruments so high quality information is available even for long terms in emerging markets c) swap rates are closely related to the underlying national bond markets and reflect the interest rates available for borrowing and investment. The data for this study is collected as of 16:30 BST from Bloomberg™. The data consists of the ask, mid and bid data for the spot and the three month and five year forward exchange rates, the US domestic and foreign fixed rates on three-month deposits and five year interest rate swaps and finally five year CDS premiums. The CDS premiums are based on a notional five-year bond of the sovereign. This paper uses a five-year horizon to examine the long-term capital market performance of covered interest rate parity because CDS and interest rate swaps are most frequently traded at that maturity. A complete set of data is collected for Brazil, Chile, Russia, South Korea and, except for CDS rates, the United Kingdom and Norway. This means the dataset consists of 18 data series for each country (15 for the UK) and including the ask, mid and bid data for the two interest rate maturities for the US, 108 data series in all.
For each country and maturity, a complete set of exchange rate, interest rate and CDS data is collected on a given day only if Bloomberg™ flags that all markets are active for that date. Bloomberg™ defines an "active trading day" for a market as a day when there is at least one transaction in the underlying instrument. The data was collected from January 1, 2003 until October 31, 2006. As it is often the case that say the CDS market was not flagged as active, the number of data points available for a given country and maturity varies from as little at 211 days for Russian at five years maturity to as much as 836 days for the UK but in total the full dataset amounts to 5,995 observations, 2,893 for emerging markets and 1,672 for the UK and 1,430 for Norway. The characteristics of the emerging market data and the UK, Norway and United States data is reported in Table 2a and Table 2b respectively.
[Place Tables 2a and 2b about here] Table 2a reports that when compared to the normal distribution, the distributions of the different data series range from the typical time series properties of excess kurtosis and positive skewness for Chile exchange rate data to negative kurtosis and negative skewness for Brazil exchange rate data. Typically the longer the term of the data the greater the variation as measured by the standard deviation. However the interest rate data is a clear exception where typically the five-year interest rate swap data is less variable than the three-month interest rate data. Table 2b reports that the UK, Norway and US interest rate data also follow this pattern. Returning to Table 2a, relative to its mean the credit default swap data displays the greatest range of all the variables followed by the five-year forward rate. The range for credit default swap data is largest for Brazil and the range for the five-year forward rate is largest for Chile.
The examination of CIRP proceeds in three steps. The first step is to evaluate standard covered interest rate parity (1b) and covered interest rate parity adjusted for credit risk (2b) using the closing daily mid price for the spot and forward exchange rates, the US and foreign interest rates and where applicable the credit default swap rates for Brazil, Chile, Russia, South Korea, Norway and the UK for three month and five-year horizons. This evaluation will give us the largest possible number of violations of covered interest rate parity, as there is no adjustment for transactions costs.
The second step corrects CIRP for transactions costs using information contained in the bid ask spread for all of the data series. Depending upon the inventory position of the market maker, transactions can occur at the extremes of the lower bid and higher ask rather than at the mid price. Therefore covered interest rate parity is calculated at the extremes of assuming all transactions work towards widening the interest rate differentials for CIRP (5a) and again by assuming all transactions work towards widening the spot forward exchange rate premium for CIRP (5b) without default insurance. As shown in the diagram below (5a) forms the lower and (5b) forms the upper limit within which covered interest rate parity still holds.
In particular the superscripts A and B refer to the ask and bid prices respectively. Note that in (5a) the currency is bought forward at the lowest possible (bid) price and sold spot as the highest possible (ask) price. Meanwhile the interest rate differentials are at the highest possible values. Together the lowest possible forward premium along with the highest possible interest rate differential forms the lower limit of CIRP that is consistent with the structure of transaction cost. Inspection of (5b) reveals that this Negative DCIRP Positive DCIRP inequality is the opposite of (5a) where the bid and ask prices work towards obtaining the highest possible forward premium and lowest possible interest rate differential that is consistent with covered interest rate parity adjusted for transactions costs. Therefore (5a) and (5b) represent the lower and upper limits that is consistent with CIRP as adjusted by transaction costs when neglecting the impact of credit risks.
Similarly, the diagram below illustrates that (6a) and (6b) represents the lower and upper limits consistent with CIRP when adjusting CIRP for the impact of credit risk as well as transactions cost. This range will be wider due to the presence of the additional credit default swap transaction.
The third step is to regress explanatory factors against deviations in covered interest rate parity DCIRP after adjusting for transactions costs but without adjusting for CDS premiums to see if credit and/or political risk can provide an explanation for deviations in CIRP. This step is necessary for two reasons. First, Duffie (1999) points out that credit default swaps only imperfectly insure against default so violations in CIRP due to credit risk can still persist even after adjusting for credit default swap premiums and transactions cost. Moreover, Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) empirically verify Duffie (1999) by finding that CDS prices are often much larger than the credit spread for corporate bonds. Second, for sovereigns the decision to default is as much political as economic and political factors that can lead to the decision to default are not included in credit risk models. To the extent that market factors can motivate the sovereign to make the political judgement to suspend payments on its debt then these market factors can provide an explanation for deviations in CIRP.
Negative DCIRP
Positive DCIRP Bearing these facts in mind a regressions model is run where the dependant variable is the deviation in CIRP, DCIRP, after adjusting for transactions costs. As illustrated in the diagram above, the lower limit (5a) should be negative and the upper limit (5b) should be positive. If the lower limit is negative, and the upper limit is positive then CIRP is not violated as the transaction costs band around covered interest rate parity contains zero. If the lower limit is positive, then DCIRP is positive and is equal to the amount by which the lower limit is positive. If the upper limit is negative, then DCIRP is negative and is equal to the amount by which the upper limit is negative.
This does mean that the sign of the DCIRP is ambiguous since an "increase" in DCIRP might be an increase in the "positiveness" of a violation in the lower limit, or an increase in the "negativeness" of the upper limit. This can cause problems in interpreting the coefficients in the later regressions. For example, as explained later in detail, an increase in volatility should be associated with "an increase" in DCIRP.
However as the above diagram shows, "an increase" in DCIRP could be a further leftward movement that is mathematically a negative relation with volatility, or a further rightward movement that is mathematically a positive relation with volatility.
Therefore the dependant variable for the regression analysis is the absolute value of the DCIRP so that an "increase" in DCIRP means a movement away from covered interest rate parity in either the positive or negative direction.
The literature provides guidance as to the likely candidates for proxies for factors that can be associated with credit risk. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) The market factor MF represents the value weighted return of the US stock market in excess of the risk free rate. 6 The data from this series is collected from French's data library. 7 We expect that there is a positive correlation between returns on the stock market and the bond market so when the return in the stock market is high so too is the return in the corporate bond market. In the mean time, better returns on the stock and bond markets imply that it is less likely that the sovereign market will decide to default on its debt obligations so deviations in covered interest rate parity DCIRP will decrease.
Apart from the Fama and French (1993) factors changes in the VIX index VIX and changes in the slope of the Treasury curve SLOPE are also chosen as proxies for credit risk. The VIX index measures the implied volatility of the near-term at-themoney S&P 500 index options. The VIX index rises when uncertainty does since an increase in volatility increases option prices. Therefore as the VIX index and therefore market volatility increases governments are more likely to default on their debt and DCIRP increase. The VIX data is collected from DataStream.
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1997) find that increases in the slope of the term structure foreshadow improvements in real economic activity while Estrella and Mishkin (1998) On the other hand foreign governments can act strategically by defaulting on their debt just as economic conditions are expected to improve. The idea here is that the slope of the US yield curve is negatively related to the level of US interest rates so that when the slope is rising, the level on interest rates are decreasing. Finally DCIRP will be mathematically rather than economically related to the levels of the market premium, market volatility and the term structure slope because deviations in covered interest rate parity DCIRP is a spread. Therefore the model is computed in the first differences. In summary the regression model is as follows.
where, ∆DCIRP i,m,t : change in the absolute value of the deviation in covered interest rate parity after transactions costs for country "i" and maturity 'm' at date't'.
∆MF t : change in the return on the US stock market in excess of the risk free rate at date t. β 1 is negative.
∆VIX t : change in the VIX index level at date 't'. β 2 is positive.
∆SLOPE t : change in the slope of term structure of interest rates as measured by the difference between ten year and three month constant maturity US Treasury yields at date't'. β 3 is negative if the slope is related to pure credit risk or positive if the slope is related to political risk.
III Numerical Analysis
The first step is to examine deviations in returns from covered interest rate parity evaluated at the mid transaction prices. The deviations in returns are examined twice, first without adjusting for credit risk by subtracting the right hand side of (1b) from its left hand side and second after adjusting for credit risk by subtracting the right hand side of (2b) from its left hand side. This step examines covered interest rate parity assuming that transactions costs are zero and so should provide the most strict condition on interest rate parity. The results are reported in Table 3 [ Table 3 about here] Table 3 measures the mean and standard deviation of deviations in returns from covered interest rate parity DCIRP for the entire sample period and for the first and second half sub-periods. 9 If covered interest rate parity were to hold then the mean deviations in returns would be zero. A positive mean indicates that returns on foreign exchange is "too high" relative to returns on interest rates while a negative mean indicates that returns on interest rates are "too high" relative to returns on foreign exchange. If violations in covered interest rate parity were caused by credit risk, we would expect that the mean deviation in returns on covered interest parity would be negative. The foreign interest rate would include a risk premium to compensate investors for perceived credit risk and so the foreign interest rate would be "too large"
relative to the US interest rate than that suggested by interest rate parity conditions alone. Table 3 shows that the mean and the standard deviation in DCIRP without adjusting for credit default swaps increase with maturity. The size of these violations at three months is typically very small, ranging from a fraction of a basis point for Russia and the UK, to a little more than five basis points for South Korea. At five years however, all of the emerging markets show evidence of a massive violation in covered interest rate parity where the DCIRP are at least 20 basis points for the entire period. In contrast, the UK DCIRP is little more than a single basis point. Norway represents an intermediate case where DCIRP is above 10 basis points in the first sub-period.
Table 3 also hints that insuring evident violations in covered interest rate parity against credit risk by using credit default swaps is liable to be ineffective in most cases. For all but Chile, DCIRP that are above 10 basis points and unadjusted by trading in credit default swaps is negative, suggesting that credit risk can explain why these larger deviations occur. However insuring these deviations against credit risk by purchasing CDS usually only creates large DCIRP of the opposite sign. South Korea is an exception where negative DCIRP of more than 28 basis points are reduced to less than 8 basis points when insuring these deviations against credit risk. Table 3 reports the "raw" DCIRP that are unadjusted for transactions cost. Many of these evident DCIRP can disappear once transactions cost incurred in order to exploit them are accounted for. Table 4 reports that DCIRP decrease once CIRP is adjusted for the impact of transactions cost. The average DCIRP is trivially small, less than one basis point for Brazil, Chile, Russia, Norway and the UK at three months maturity.
However, moving into longer time horizons DCIRP parity still remains high for all emerging markets, ranging from six basis points for Chile to a very large 94 basis points for Brazil. In contrast DCIRP remain trivial only for Norway and the UK.
[ Table 4 about here]
Insuring these DCIRP against credit risk via CDS is usually ineffective. After transactions costs, the insured deviations are actually larger for Chile and larger and of the opposite sign for Brazil and Russia. These results are consistent with Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) who find that CDS prices are too large relative to the credit spread implying that credit risk is overpriced by CDS. South Korea is an exception however since insuring DCIRP using CDS reduces deviations of approximately 22 basis points for five years maturity to less than four basis points.
While Table 4 reports the average DCIRP after transactions and credit insurance costs one would also like information concerning the number and frequency of evident DCIRP. Table 5 addresses this gap by reporting the number and sample frequency of DCIRP after adjusting for transactions costs. The incidence of DCIRP is infrequent, less than 10% of the sample size, for Brazil, Chile, Russia and Norway at three months maturity. Surprisingly the incidence of DCIRP for the UK is nearly 20% at three months maturity. However, combined with the trivially small average size of transaction adjusted DCIRP as reported in Table 4 , it is evident that covered interest rate parity holds at three months for Brazil, Chile, Russia, Norway and the UK.
10
On the other hand, the frequency of DCIRP is very large at five years maturity all four emerging markets as well as Norway. For the emerging markets, even when insuring these DCIRP against credit risk via CDS does not materially reduce the frequency of DCIRP. Recognising that Table 4 reports that the average DCIRP is generally not small for longer maturities, one is compelled to conclude that covered interest rate parity does not hold for these emerging markets for longer terms. Meanwhile the number of violations of CIRP is less than five percent for the UK. Combined with the trivial size of these violations as reported in Table 4 , it is evident that covered interest rate parity holds for the UK at five years maturity. Similarly, we conclude that CIRP holds at five years for Norway as well as the average size of violations in Table 4 are so small that any profits to be gained by trading on violations of CIRP are economically trivial.
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[ Table 5 about here]
IV Regression analysis
The numerical analysis concludes that while covered interest rate parity does hold for the UK in the short and long term and for the emerging markets for the short term, it does not hold for emerging markets for longer-term maturities. Since for longer maturities, the use of CDS can merely reverse the sign and more often than not increase DCIRP it is difficult to suggest that credit risk is the reason for these DCIRP.
Therefore this study regresses common proxies for credit risk on the absolute value of DCIRP in an attempt to see if these violations are due to credit risk.
It is natural to suggest that market turbulence can be related to DCIRP (Taylor 1989) , and in fact Bhar, Kim and Pham (2004) find statistical evidence that this is so.
Moreover the regression model (7) finds that autocorrelation is sometimes present.
This naturally suggests that (7) could be affected by "autocorrelation in volatility" so the first step is to test to see if ARCH effects are present in (7). When ARCH effects are present then (7) is augmented by (8) according to the procedures as established by Bollerslev (1986) and Taylor (1987) . This needs to be done since standard errors are biased and inconsistent in the presence of ARCH effects. GARCH models are a particularly attractive method for correcting for ARCH errors since a GARCH model is a parsimonious representation of an infinite order ARCH model that avoids overfitting (see Brooks 2002 ).
Since there is little theoretical justification for anything other than first order GARCH errors a GARCH (1,1) model is run when there is evidence that ARCH effects are present. In this case the error term in (7) is estimated as seen in (8) (7) is run using OLS and robust standard errors as suggested by White (1980) and if autocorrelation is present then (7) is run using an autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent estimate according to the Newey and West (1987) procedure.
The results of these econometric procedures are presented in Table 6 . 12 The first row for each country and maturity reports the results of two chi-square tests, the first tests whether the underlying OLS model is statistically significant and the second tests whether the error term in (7) displays ARCH effects. If the ARCH effects test is significant, (7) is augmented by a GARCH (1,1) model for the error term and the results report values for the coefficients of the constant VOL C, the lagged volatility Vol α and last period's fitted variance VOL β for the error structure according to (8).
In all but one case, specifically for Chile at five years, the change in DCIRP shows evidence of ARCH effects so in all these cases (7) is corrected for a GARCH (1,1) error structure and is estimated using maximum likelihood. The coefficients for the market factor MF, the VIX index and for the slope of the US term structure SLOPE are statistically significant and of the expected sign in seven instances.
Interestingly the sign of the slope of the US term structure SLOPE tends to be positive at three months, significantly so for Chile, but is consistently negative at five years and significantly so for Brazil and South Korea. Earlier we noted that the SLOPE might be positively related to DCIRP as the sovereign can act strategically by choosing to default when the economic picture is improving as signalled by an increasing SLOPE. This finding suggests that political risk is more of a factor for short-term rather than long-term capital markets.
Notice that at five years maturity for Brazil and South Korea, where Table 4 reports the largest negative DCIRP after transactions costs (but not including default insurance) and Table 5 reports an extraordinary large percentage of violations in covered interest rate parity (85 and71% respectively), two of the three coefficients associated with credit risk is statistically significant. In other words, where there is strong evidence of violations in covered interest rate parity, there is the strongest evidence that DCIRP is related to aspects of credit risk.
V Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines deviations in covered interest rate parity for Brazil, Chile, Russia, South Korea, Norway and the UK. While there is little evidence of any violation in covered interest rate parity at three months maturity, particularly for Brazil, Chile, Russia, Norway and the UK, the size and frequency of violations in covered interest rate volatility increase with maturity for the four emerging markets.
This study concludes that covered interest rate parity holds for the UK and Norway for long and short-term capital markets, but holds for the emerging markets only for the short term.
Insuring against default using credit default swaps did not seem to materially affect these results. When insuring DCIRP with CDS the violation in covered interest rate parity often merely change sign from a large negative to a large positive thereby suggesting that CDS overprice credit risk. However, this study still finds that these violations are probably due to credit risk as the largest violations in covered interest rate parity in the emerging markets are associated with factors related to credit risk.
Overall this paper finds that there is indeed violations in covered interest rate parity in the long-term capital markets and the source of these violations is credit risk rather than the size of the economy or liquidity of the foreign exchange market. 4 The size factor (Small Minus Big) is the return from investing in a portfolio of small firms in excess of the return from investing in a portfolio of big firms. The momentum factor (High Minus Low) is the return from investing in high book to market value firms in excess of the returns from investing in a portfolio of low book to market value firms. The idea is that the empirical anomalies of excess returns in small firms and firms with high book to market capitalisation ratios that can not be explained by the capital asset pricing model are actually proxing for priced risk factors. 5 The correlation table is omitted for the sake of brevity. It is available from the author upon request. Also, there is still some controversy concerning precisely what source of systematic risk is being proxied by SMB and HML whereas there is a consensus that MF measures the systematic risk of investing in the market portfolio so to avoid any possible confusion concerning the interpretation of the results the MF is used. 6 For details of the construction of this variable see Fama and French (1993) . 7 French's data library web address is http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ ken.french/data_library.html. 8 The sample correlation between the slope of the US Treasury yield curve and the three-month T-bill rates is -0.50 for the entire sample period. As mentioned in footnote 4, the correlation table is available from the author upon request. 10 This is particularly true for the UK since the size of the DCIRP is typically less than one half of a basis point and can be a result of rounding. The economic consequence suggests that for every $1 million transaction, an investor could earn less than $50. 11 We also repeated the GARCH regression analysis as reported in Table 6 for Norway and we could not find any proxy for credit risk that is even remotely significant in explaining the many, but small deviations in covered interest rate parity. As a deviation of a little more than one basis point is still economically trivial, and a 20% violation suggests that a trader can only make about $100 a week in trading on violations in covered interest rate parity for trades of $1 million. 12 The UK is not included in Table 6, as Tables 3,4 and 5 show no evidence of violation in covered interest rate parity for the UK.
